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KLEIN v. DOVE
for a future reconciliation, the dissenting opinion holds that
their voluntary separation was of a character insufficient
to qualify the parties for an absolute divorce.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that the France
case,26 although correct under its particular factual situa-
tion, actually went too far and laid down a broad rule of
law not applicable to the principal case. Moreover, it ap-
pears that the principal case is just the type of case the
legislature had in mind when the statute2" was passed.
The statute provides for an 18 month "cooling-off" period
during which time the parties may reconsider that their
marriage of long standing should not be dissolved by a
hasty, ill-advised divorce. The very purpose of the statute
is to encourage the separated parties to make amends and
attempt to reconcile their differences; if the parties at the
time of separating recognize the possibility of such a future
reconciliation, they should not thereafter be penalized for
their failure to reconcile. The reasoning of the dissenting
opinion will tend to obviate the very purpose of the statute,
and it is respectfully submitted that the majority of the
Court of Appeals, adopted a more realistic approach in the
principal case, by eliminating the requirement of "a com-
mon intent not to resume marital relations", which was
engrafted on the statute by the France case.
EASEMENT IMPLIED BY REFERENCE TO A PLAT
Klein v. Dove 1
By Ci oSOpmEm H. FoR1MAN*
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a bill in equity to enjoin the
defendants-appellants from obstructing an alleged right of
way leading to a beach and lake area. Plaintiffs and defen-
dants are each owners of lots in a fifty-acre waterfront de-
velopment, having derived title from a common grantor.
The lots were described in a plat duly recorded, showing the
location of the lots, various projected streets or roads, three
piers, and the lake and lake area. Among the roads shown
on the recorded plat of the development, a ten-foot road or
right of way appears along one side of defendants' lot. This
Ibid.
2Supra, n. 22.
* Third Year Evening Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
205 Md. 285, 107 A. 2d 82 (1954).
1955]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
right of way was obstructed by the defendants, and had
been previously obstructed by them or by previous owners
for some years before the institution of suit. Plaintiffs are
owners of interior lots and have no access to the beach area
except by way of the alleged right of way or a narrow pier.
Plaintiffs' lots abutted upon a central or main road, and the
alleged right of way led from that central road to the beach
area and lake. However, Plaintiffs' lots were not contiguous
to the right of way. The trial court held the plaintiffs en-
titled to the use of the lake area of the development for
recreational purposes and to an unobstructed right of way
over the strip along one side of defendants' lot, and granted
the injunction for which the plaintiffs' bill prayed. Defen-
dants appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
trial court's decision.
The precise question before the court was whether a
purchaser of a lot in a water-front development, of which
a recorded plat shows a ten-foot right of way leading to a
beach area, acquires an easement in the beach area and the
way leading thereto, although the purchaser's lot is not
adjacent to the way. The Court of Appeals held that
although the plat did not specifically designate the beach
area as a "community beach", the sale of a lot in a water-
front development by reference to a plat, showing such a
beach area and a ten-foot right of way leading thereto, im-
plicitly granted the use of the beach area and of the right of
way to the purchaser although his lot was not adjacent to
the right of way. There is, at least, an apparent conflict
between this result and the rule enunciated and applied in
prior decisions of the Court of Appeals. It is the purpose
of this note to determine whether that apparent conflict is
real, and to analyze some of the decided cases to ascertain
the basis upon which an easement will be implied by refer-
ence to a plat in the law of Maryland.
In two earlier decisions, Moale v. Baltimore2 and Hawley
v. Baltimore,' the Court had expressly limited the pur-
chaser's easement to the streets or roads upon which his lot
abutted. In the Moale case, a condemnation proceeding
involving the opening of Biddle Street as a public street,
the plaintiff had purchased two lots, "A" and "B". Both
lots were described as binding on Biddle Street, not yet
opened as a public way. Lot "A" was between Cathedral
Street, an existing public way, and Decker Street, another
existing public way, while lot "B" lay between Decker
25 Md. 314 (1854).
2 33 Md. 270 (1870).
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Street and Charles Street. Both lots were purchased by
the plaintiff from the same person who had before sold lot
"C" (which lay across Biddle Street from lot "A") to a third
party. The Court held in that case, that as lot "A" was pur-
chased by Moale after the purchase by the third person of
lot "C", which was also described as binding on Biddle
Street, it was subject to the rights which the third person
had acquired by implication in his previous purchase,
among which was the right to the use of Biddle Street
between Cathedral and Decker. Thus, only nominal dam-
ages were allowed for lot "A". But lot "B", lying between
Decker and Charles Streets, was held not be affected by
this implication, because plaintiff himself owned the lots
on either side of lot "B",4 and the lower court's ruling that
he was entitled only to nominal damages as to this lot be-
tween Decker and Charles Streets was reversed.
In the Hawley case,' a condemnation proceeding in-
volving facts not materially different from those of the
Moale case, the holding of this earlier case was followed,
and the Court said:
"The doctrine of implied covenants will not be held
to create a right of way over all the lands of a vendor
which may lie, however remote, in the bed of a street.
The lands must be contiguous to the lots sold .... The
true doctrine is, as we understand it, that the purchaser
of a lot calling to bind on a street, not yet opened by the
public authorities, is entitled to a right of way over it,
if it is of the lands of his vendor, to its full extent and
dimensions only until it reaches some other street or
public way. To this extent will the vendor be held by
the implied covenant of his deed and no further."'
In the instant case the Court distinguished the Hawley case
as not controlling saying:
"Cases such as Hawley v. Baltimore, . . . holding
that the grant to a purchaser of the right to use the
streets shown on a plat filed by a vendor gives the right
to the purchaser to use only the street upon which his
'The relationship between the private easement implicitly granted and
public rights arising from dedication is beyond the scope of this note. Cf. in
this connection, White v. Flannigan, 1 Md. 525 (1852) ; Moale v. Baltimore,
8upra, n. 2; Hawley v. Baltimore, 8upra, n. 3; McCormick v. Baltimore, 45
Md. 512 (1877) ; Tinges v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 600 (1879) ; Hall v. Baltimore,
56 Md. 187 (1881) ; Baltimore v. White, 62 Md. 362 (1884) ; Glenn v. M. &
C. of Baltimore, 67 Md. 390, 10 A. 70 (1887).
5 Supra, n. 3.
6 Ibid, 280. Italics supplied.
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land abuts and such other street or streets shown on
the plat and owned by the vendor as may be necessary
to reach a public street, have no application here."7
The Court relied primarily upon the authority of
Williams Realty Co. v. Robey8 for its decision. In the
Williams case the grantor sold lots in a water-front develop-
ment. The development was described in two plats, the
first of which was not recorded but showed an area marked
off as "community Beach and Park". The second plat was
prepared one month after the first and was recorded, show-
ing the same (unplatted) open space as the first, but did not
designate the area as a community beach and park. The
evidence showed, however, that the grantor continued to
sell by showing buyers the first plat and orally representing
that the community area would be provided. In a suit by
the purchaser to enjoin sub-division of the area designated
as a community area on the first plat, the plaintiffs suc-
ceeded in the lower court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
saying:
".... when a buyer is persuaded, as in this case, by
the assurances of restricted facilities in a community
beach lying immediately across his front road or street,
the advantages appear with sufficient clearness and
certainty to have been sold to him as an incident...."I
The Williams case is authority for raising an easement in a
beach area shown upon a plat of a water-front development
by reference to which the grantees are pursuaded to pur-
chase lots in the development. This seems to be in accord
with the weight of authority, as set forth in Corpus Juris:
"Where land is sold with reference to a map or plat
showing a park, beach, or open square, the purchaser
acquires an easement that such area shall be used in
the manner designated, and an easement over the
streets which afford access to such area."'10
It was apparently upon this principle that the court decided
the Williams case and the instant case. The result seems
correct and properly distinguishable from the case of an
easement raised in a street or way to be used as a route of
access to public ways. The apparent conflict arises from
the broad language used by the Court in explaining its
7 Supra, n. 1, 292.6 175 Md. 532, 2 A. 2d 683 (1938), noted 5 Univ. of Pitt. L. Rev. 195 (1939).
o Ibid, 540.
10 28 C. J. S. 708, Easements, Sec. 44.
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decision of the Hawley case, that, "the lands must be con-
tiguous to the lot sold.. ." However, a later case with dif-
ferent facts may demonstrate a need for restricting lan-
guage in an earlier case to the particular result it supported;
and, judicial flexing of the doctrine of stare decisis to meet
the need of a later case is to be anticipated."
Various bases have been suggested by the courts for
raising easements by implication from recorded or unre-
corded plats. 2 In some cases language has been used which
suggest that the easements arise from the grantor's implied
covenant that areas or streets shown on the plat will be
available to the grantee for their apparent purpose.'" Courts
have sometimes indicated that the rights protected arise
as a consequence of the application of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, i.e., the grantor, having represented by
the plat that the streets or areas will be laid out and avail-
able for an apparent purpose, is estopped to deny his repre-
sentations. Other courts have sometimes reasoned that the
easements raised rest in implied grant. 4 Whatever the
basis in legal philosophy may be, it appears in each case
that the Court is attempting to give effect to the grantor's
intention as it must have reasonably appeared to the
grantee. For this reason it is not inconsistent for the same
Court to hold that while a grantee of a lot sold by reference
to a plat showing streets or roads takes an easement only
in the streets upon which his lot abuts, a grantee of a lot in
a water-front development, sold by reference to a plat show-
ing a beach area and a right of way leading thereto, takes
an easement in the beach and way though his lot abuts on
neither. In the former case the grantee has all of the
benefits implicitly appurtenant to his premises if he has
access by continguous roads to the nearest public way. In
the water-front case the benefit for which he bargains cer-
tainly includes the beach area itself whether or not it abuts
on his premises. 5 At all events, this seems to represent the
n CI. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 452-3 (1939), dealing with language
in Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
12For an extended discussion of this problem see 3 TIFFANY, REML
PROtpaRTY (3rd ed. 1939), Sec. 800.
8This seems to be the view of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See
Moale v. Baltimore, supra, n. 2, and Hawley v. Baltimore, 8upra, n. 3.
I "When a lot conveyed by a deed is described by reference to a map,
such map becomes a part of the deed . . . The making and filing of
such a map duly signed and acknowledged by the owner . . . is
equivalent to a declaration that such right is attached to each lot as
an appurtenance."
Danielson v. Sykes, 157 Cal. 686, 109 P. 87 (1910).
"Cases on the extent of the easement are collected in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1024. See also 5 Univ. of Pitt. L. Rev. 195 (1939).
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current law upon the point in this jurisdiction, for, in the
words of the trial judge, quoted with approval by the Court
of Appeals:
"'After all is said and done, a water-front develop-
ment cannot be a water-front development without a
water-front'."'16
THE EFFECT OF AN ENCROACHMENT ON
MUNICIPAL PROPERTY ON THE
MARKETABILITY OF TITLE
Sinclair v. Weber'
On November 30, 1951, the defendant entered into a
contract to purchase the improved property on the north-
east corner of Greenmount Avenue and Old York Road
when it was put up at auction by the agent of the plaintiffs.
The contract memorandum consisted of a sales agreement,
part of which said:
"I having had the same opportunity as others to
examine the property, agree to pay for same and take
title with all its faults and errors of description, it being
understood that the Auctioneers have made no war-
ranty or representations whatever, except that the title
must be found merchantable."2
The defendant, a real estate broker whose business con-
sisted of buying property for rent or resale, was given
immediate possession. The defendant's attorney engaged a
registered surveyor to survey the land. The surveyor's plat,
dated January 8,1952, showed an encroachment of one wall
of the building beyond the building line of Greenmount
Avenue from five to thirteen inches. It was shown at the
trial that the encroachment had existed for at least fifty
and probably one hundred years. It was also shown that
the Waverly Building Association had loaned money on the
property, after approval of the title by its attorney. No
evidence was introduced to show that anyone had known
1* Supra, n. 1, 292. For other Maryland cases involving easements implied
by reference to a plat, or by language in a deed calling the lot conveyed to
bind upon an unopened sheet see the following: White v. Flannigan, 1 Md.
525 (1852) ; Pitts v. Baltimore, 73 Md. 326, 21 A. 52 (1891). For an early
case refusing to apply the doctrine because of the parole evidence rule see
Howard v. Rogers, 4 H. & J. 278 (Md., 1817).
'204 Md. 324, 104 A. 2d 561 (1954).
2 Ibid, 329-330.
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